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Abstract 
 
During the last several years, spending on prescription drugs in the U.S. increased at a 15% annual rate, 
with the $178 billion spent in 2002 accounting for more than 11% of health care expenditures in the U.S.  
This growth has been largely driven by a shift to new drugs, which are typically more expensive than 
earlier drugs within the same therapeutic category.  Recent research has suggested that the shift to new 
drugs may lower health care spending by reducing the demand for hospitalizations and other health care 
services.  Using a 20% sample of Medicaid recipients from the state of California for the 1993-2001 
period, I investigate this hypothesis for antipsychotic drugs - the therapeutic category that has accounted 
for more government spending than any other during the past decade.  Using three different identification 
strategies, my findings demonstrate that the 610% increase in Medicaid spending on antipsychotic drugs 
during the study period caused by the shift to three new treatments has not reduced spending on other 
types of medical care, thus undermining the hypothesis that the drugs have “paid for themselves.”  
Because of data limitations the findings for health outcomes are necessarily more speculative but suggest 
that the new medications have increased the prevalence of diabetes while reducing the prevalence of 
extrapyramidal symptoms among the mentally ill. 
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1. Introduction 
From 1996 to 2002, spending on prescription drugs in the U.S. grew at a 15% annual rate, with 
the $178 billion spent in 2002 accounting for more than 11% of all health care expenditures. This growth 
was mainly driven by an increase in the average price of a prescription, which rose by more than 10% per 
year from 1996 to 2001.  Price increases were caused both by an increase in the price of existing drugs 
and by a shift to newly approved drugs, which tend to be more expensive than the drugs that preceded 
them in the same therapeutic category (NIHCM, 2002).  The growth in pharmaceutical spending has been 
similarly rapid within the federal-state Medicaid program, with expenditures there increasing from $12.3 
billion in 1996 to $29.6 billion in 2002.1 State governments have differed in their response to the increase, 
with some requiring co-pays by Medicaid recipients, others introducing dispensing limits, and still others 
requiring physicians to obtain prior authorization before prescribing drugs not on the state’s formulary. 
Determining how optimally to respond - if at all - to the growth in Medicaid prescription drug 
spending is clearly a complicated problem.  The program provides valuable insurance to millions of 
society’s most disadvantaged individuals, covering the cost of more than 520 million prescriptions for 
nearly 47 million Medicaid recipients in 2002.  But because Medicaid recipients typically do not share in 
the cost of their prescription drugs, the program distorts medical care purchase decisions, potentially 
leading a Medicaid recipient to select an expensive drug over a much cheaper alternative even if he/she is 
almost indifferent between the two.  It is therefore plausible that – in some cases – a Medicaid recipient 
would derive a benefit from a drug treatment that is substantially lower than the cost to taxpayers.2 
But as recent researchers have noted, the difference between two drug prices may not accurately 
reflect the difference in health care spending that would result if a patient were to choose one treatment 
over another (Lichtenberg, 1996, 2001).  For example, a more expensive drug may deliver health benefits 
that reduce the patient’s demand for other health care services, to some extent offsetting its higher price.  
A similar offset effect could occur for individuals who otherwise would take no treatment.  Even with no 
                                                 
1 Dollar figures cited here and elsewhere in the paper are adjusted to 2001 dollars using the CPI-U index.  
2 This moral hazard effect is of course not unique to Medicaid.  Individuals with other forms of health insurance also 
typically pay a small share (if any) of the costs of additional medical care.   
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offset effect, a more expensive treatment may deliver health or quality of life benefits that are sufficiently 
large to pass a cost-benefit test.  In measuring the value of any drug treatment, one would like to know its 
effect on both spending and health, with these effects potentially varying across individuals. 
In this paper, I investigate the effect of new prescription drugs on both Medicaid spending and 
health outcomes. This question is inherently difficult given that drug treatment is not randomly assigned 
and because there are thousands of drugs covered by Medicaid at a point-in-time.  Rather than 
simultaneously considering all of them, I focus on the one therapeutic category that accounts for more 
Medicaid spending than any other.  Antipsychotic drugs are used to treat schizophrenia, bipolar disorder, 
and dementia and the Medicaid program spent $3.73 billion on them in 2002.  Risperdal, Zyprexa, and 
Seroquel - three drugs that were approved by the FDA and entered the market during the mid-1990s - 
accounted for 88% of this spending.  These three “second-generation” antipsychotics are substantially 
more expensive than the drug treatments that preceded them and were numbers one, two, and four, 
respectively, among all prescription drugs in terms of 2002 Medicaid spending. 
To estimate the impact of these new drug treatments and the accompanying increase in 
prescription drug spending, I utilize complete claims and eligibility data for a 20% sample of Medicaid 
recipients from the state of California for the 1993-2001 period.  I construct the initial sample by selecting 
the 37,369 individuals diagnosed with schizophrenia (the condition for which these drugs are most 
commonly prescribed) at some point during the nine-year study period.  This long time period allows me 
to exploit changes in treatment patterns from a year when no schizophrenia patients were taking 
Risperdal, Zyprexa, or Seroquel until 2001, a year when nearly 70% were taking one of these drugs. 
There are two central challenges for reliable estimation of the effect of these new drug treatments.  
The first is that drug treatments are not randomly assigned in the Medicaid program.  Individuals who 
take a certain drug are likely to differ systematically from their counterparts who do not.  While many of 
these differences are likely to be observable, some may not be, and this unobserved heterogeneity could 
lead to biased estimates. To surmount this obstacle, I employ three strategies to estimate the effect of 
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second-generation antipsychotics.  None of these methods is free from potential biases, but because each 
one has different limitations it can act as a check on the other two to gauge the robustness of the results.   
The second main challenge for this study is that the Medicaid data will provide an incomplete 
picture of health for individuals in the sample. Following previous studies, I focus on the prevalence of 
adverse side effects when investigating whether the new drugs have influenced health.  Earlier research 
has found that second-generation antipsychotics improve health by reducing the prevalence of 
extrapyramidal symptoms (EPS) including involuntary movements, tremors, and body restlessness 
(Kerwin, 1994; Leucht et al, 1999).  A number of recent studies suggest that the new drugs may reduce 
health by increasing the prevalence of diabetes and related illnesses (Sernyak et al, 2002; Lindenmayer et 
al, 2001).  But both sets of results are controversial, with some finding no impact of second-generation 
antipsychotics on EPS (Rosenheck et al, 2003) and others no effect on diabetes (Kabinoff et al, 2003). 
My first identification strategy examines changes statewide in outcome variables of interest as the 
new medications are used by an increasing fraction of individuals with schizophrenia.  This analysis 
demonstrates that the diffusion of second-generation antipsychotics has been associated with a substantial 
increase in prescription drug spending but no apparent reduction in spending on other health care services.  
This also holds true in those periods when there is a sharp break in trend in the diffusion rate of the new 
drugs.  The increase in the use of these drugs was associated with a decline in the measured prevalence of 
extrapyramidal symptoms but also with an increase in the fraction diagnosed with diabetes. 
Of course, a trend analysis for just one geographic area suffers from the difficulty that factors 
other than antipsychotic treatments that may influence the outcome variables of interest are changing over 
time.  To control for these potential confounders, I next exploit variation across geographic areas in the 
rate at which second-generation drugs diffuse.  My findings using this strategy demonstrate that the areas 
in which the utilization of second-generation drugs increased relatively rapidly had substantially larger 
increases in Medicaid spending and a significantly greater increase in the measured prevalence of diabetes 
than those areas with relatively little use of the new treatments.  On the plus side, my findings here 
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suggest that increases in the use of these drugs have been associated with a modest reduction in the 
prevalence of extrapyramidal symptoms, though the estimates are not statistically significant. 
An important limitation to this second strategy is that some of the variation across geographic 
areas in the rate at which the new treatments diffuse may be driven by changes in health or other factors 
that could lead to biased estimates of the effect of the new treatments.  Thus my third method utilizes an 
instrumental variables strategy with individual-level data that exploits variation across psychiatrists in the 
propensity to prescribe second-generation antipsychotics. This method controls for differences across 
psychiatrists in the baseline characteristics of their patients and aims to estimate the effect of the new drug 
treatments for marginal patients – individuals who would take the drug when paired with certain 
psychiatrists but not with others.  The findings here demonstrate that psychiatrists have a substantial 
effect on the probability that a schizophrenia patient takes a second-generation drug and that the new 
treatments significantly increase Medicaid spending for the marginal patient. 
Taken together, the findings presented in this paper suggest that second-generation antipsychotics 
did not reduce spending on other types of medical care. This finding undermines the hypothesis that the 
new drugs – which are several times more expensive than first-generation antipsychotics - to some extent 
paid for themselves.  The findings for health outcomes are less clear-cut because there appear to be both 
positive and negative effects and because health is not perfectly measured in the Medicaid data. 
2. Background and Previous Research 
Schizophrenia is a chronic and debilitating mental illness that afflicts nearly 2 million individuals 
in the U.S.  It is characterized by a range of symptoms, including delusions, hallucinations, cognitive 
impairments, and social withdrawal.  While there is no known cure for schizophrenia, patient symptoms 
often improve in response to treatment with antipsychotic drugs.  Until 1990, physicians typically 
prescribed haloperidol or some other “first-generation” antipsychotic for the treatment of schizophrenia.  
While these drugs were often effective in treating the symptoms of schizophrenia, one important 
disadvantage was their side effect profile.  Patients taking the drugs frequently experienced 
extrapyramidal symptoms (EPS) that could include tardive dyskinesia (involuntary movements), 
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Parkinsonism (tremors and rigidity), akathisia (restlessness), acute dystonia (muscle contractions), and 
neuroleptic malignant syndrome (changes in heart rate or breathing). 
 Treatment patterns began to change in 1990 following the FDA’s approval of Clozaril, the first in 
a line of “second-generation” antipsychotics that appeared to reduce the prevalence of extrapyramidal 
symptoms while treating the positive symptoms of schizophrenia (Lamberg, 1998; Keefe et al, 1999; 
Meltzer et al, 1999). Though Clozaril was found to have serious side effects of its own that limited its use 
to schizophrenia patients who could not tolerate other drugs, the shift to second-generation antipsychotics 
accelerated following the introduction of Risperdal in 1994, Zyprexa in 1996, and Seroquel in 1997. 
These latter three drugs were several times more expensive than haloperidol and other first-generation 
drugs and quickly became the most commonly prescribed drugs in the treatment of schizophrenia. 
A. Previous Research 
A number of previous studies have investigated the relationship between the use of second-
generation antipsychotics and total health care spending.  The findings from these studies are mixed, with 
some suggesting that the drugs reduce expenditures (Glazer and Johnstone, 1997) and others finding the 
opposite (Coley et al, 1999).  As a recent review article notes (Hudson et al, 2003) the findings from most 
of the previous studies are not conclusive because of small sample sizes, short time periods, imputed data, 
or other design limitations.  An even larger body of research has examined the effect of second-generation 
antipsychotics on the prevalence of adverse side effects, including extrapyramidal symptoms, diabetes, 
abnormal weight gain, and hyperlipidemia (Gianfrancesco et al, 2002; Kerwin, 1994; Koro et al, 2002; 
Leucht et al, 2001; Lund et al, 2001; Meyer, 2001; Sernyak et al, 2002).  Taken together, these studies 
suggest that second-generation drugs have fewer adverse extrapyramidal side effects than the earlier 
drugs but that they may increase the prevalence of diabetes and related illnesses.3  Both sets of results are 
controversial, however, with some finding no impact of second-generation antipsychotics on EPS 
(Rosenheck et al, 2003) and others no effect on diabetes (Kabinoff et al, 2003). 
                                                 
3 It is important to note that the magnitude of these estimates vary substantially across studies and across drugs. 
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 One prominent recent study compared the effect on both health outcomes and health care 
spending of haloperidol and Zyprexa, the most commonly prescribed first and second-generation drugs, 
respectively (Rosenheck et al, 2003).  The study enrolled 309 schizophrenia patients insured by the 
Department of Veterans’ Affairs (DVA) and randomized each person to haloperidol or Zyprexa for up to 
one year. A wide set of outcome measures were considered, including cognitive functioning, quality of 
life, adverse side effects, and health care spending.  The findings from this study suggest that Zyprexa did 
not lower hospitalization rates or other types of health care utilization.  Because of this and given the 
substantial difference in the cost of these two drugs, spending for individuals taking Zyprexa was 
substantially higher than for those in the haloperidol group.  The authors also found little evidence to 
suggest that Zyprexa increased compliance, reduced the prevalence of adverse side effects, or improved 
quality of life.  The findings did suggest that Zyprexa reduced the prevalence of akathasia (restlessness) 
and led to modest improvements in cognitive functioning but also found that individuals taking this drug 
were more likely to gain a substantial amount of weight, potentially increasing their risk for diabetes. 
While this study and previous ones using a randomized research design have made important 
contributions to knowledge, there are a number of limitations that motivate the current study.  First, 
randomized studies are well-suited to estimating the average effect of a drug but are unable to estimate its 
effect on the marginal patient.  The distinction between these two causal parameters has been emphasized 
in economics4 but cannot be explored in the typical randomized study of alternative health care 
treatments.  As previous authors have noted (McClellan et al, 1994), it is this marginal effect that may be 
more relevant when forecasting the effect of alternative policy interventions. 
 Second, most randomized studies have small sample sizes with which it is difficult to obtain 
sufficient precision for a skewed outcome variable such as health care spending.  The main reason for this 
is cost – randomized studies are very expensive to administer – and thus the ones that consider costs often 
have wide confidence intervals.  A third limitation of most randomized studies is their focus on just two 
                                                 
4 See, for example, many of the studies that estimate the return to schooling summarized in Card (2003). 
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drugs.  Though the Rosenheck study does consider the most common first and second-generation drugs, 
these two currently account for less than one-third of antipsychotic prescriptions. 
An additional limitation of randomized studies is that they are often tightly controlled.  
Individuals may be much less likely to adhere to a treatment regimen in real-world settings. Similarly, 
randomized studies usually follow individuals for just a short time, with the maximum duration typically 
equal to one year.  A sixth limitation is that they often focus on a small subset of individuals who are 
possible candidates for a drug.  In the case of the Rosenheck study, only males in their forties who had 
recently been hospitalized were considered.  And one final limitation of randomized studies is that 
individuals can choose not to participate.  While the Rosenheck study successfully enrolled 309 
individuals, there were 1530 who either refused to participate or whose clinicians would not allow them 
to join the study.  If the individuals who enroll in a study are substantially different from those who 
choose not to participate then the estimates may not apply for this other group.5 
B. Medicaid and the Market for Antipsychotic Drugs 
From 1996 to 2002, Medicaid spending in the U.S. on prescription drugs increased by 141% from 
$12.3 billion to $29.6 billion.  This growth far outpaced Medicaid spending on other health care services, 
which increased by just 29% during this same period.  In both years, spending for drugs used to treat 
central nervous system (CNS) disorders was greater than for any other therapeutic category. 
Within the CNS therapeutic category, antipsychotic drugs accounted for 51% of the $7.34 billion 
in 2002 Medicaid spending.  During the 1996-2002 period, Medicaid spending on antipsychotic drugs 
grew at a 25% annual rate, with most of this expenditure growth explained by an increase from $61 to 
$171 in the average price of an antipsychotic prescription.  Zyprexa, Risperdal, and Seroquel accounted 
for 88% of U.S. Medicaid spending on antipsychotic drugs in 2002 and were ranked first, second, and 
fourth, respectively, in terms of total Medicaid spending among all prescription drugs in that same year. 
                                                 
5 An additional issue with previous studies (both randomized and other) in this area is that a large fraction of them 
were funded by one of the three pharmaceutical companies that produce the new second-generation drugs. 
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One interesting feature of this category of drugs is the importance of Medicaid.  While this 
program paid for 18% of all prescriptions filled in the U.S. in 2002, the corresponding share for 
antipsychotic drugs was nearly 75% (Duggan, 2003).  Given this high Medicaid market share, the current 
study’s focus on beneficiaries of this program is not as limiting as it might otherwise be. 
3. The Medicaid Sample and the Diffusion of Second-Generation Antipsychotic Drugs 
A. The Medicaid Claims and Eligibility Data 
To estimate the effect of second-generation antipsychotic drugs on health care spending and 
health outcomes, I use an administrative data set constructed by the California Department of Health 
Services (DHS) that contains all Medicaid claims and detailed eligibility data for a random 20% sample 
of California residents with at least one month of Medicaid eligibility between January of 1993 and 
December of 2001.6  There are 2.92 million individuals in the sample, implying that approximately 14.6 
million Californians were eligible for the program in one or more months during this nine-year period. 
The annual Medicaid eligibility files contain demographic information for each individual in the 
sample, including gender, month and year of birth, race/ethnicity, and zip code of residence.  The file 
provides Medicaid eligibility information for each of the twelve months during the year and also contains 
month-by-month information on the individual’s aid code, which reports whether the person is eligible for 
Medicaid through welfare, Supplemental Security Income (SSI), or some other government program.  
Additionally, there are two variables in each month that indicate whether an individual is eligible for Part 
A or Part B of the Medicare program.  Many Medicaid recipients are dually eligible for Medicare because 
of their receipt of social security benefits.  Finally, the eligibility data indicate whether each recipient is 
enrolled in a managed care plan and if so provides the plan number. 7 
In a typical year, the Medicaid claims data for the 20 percent sample contain more than 30 million 
claims.  These include every fee-for-service payment made on behalf of individuals in the sample while 
they are eligible for Medicaid.  Each claim includes the individual’s Medicaid identifier, which can be 
                                                 
6 DHS sampled by individual rather than by eligibility spell when constructing these files.  Thus if one person has 
multiple spells of eligibility during this nine-year period every spell would be included.   
7 Though the utilization data will be incomplete for managed care recipients, a file with capitation rates by aid code, 
plan number, and month can be used to calculate Medicaid managed care spending for them (Duggan, 2004). 
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matched to the eligibility files.  There are three main types of claims in the data.  Inpatient claims include 
detailed information about admissions to hospitals and long-term care facilities.  Outpatient and other 
ambulatory claims have similar data about payments to physicians, clinics, hospital outpatient facilities, 
laboratories, and other health care providers.  Finally, prescription drug claims provide a drug code – 
which can be linked to a companion file to determine the drug and dosage amount – as well as the number 
of units dispensed for each prescription.  The claims data include all fee-for-service payments made in the 
ten-year period from January of 1993 until December of 2002, though because there is often a lag in 
processing the claims the current study will focus on the nine-year period ending in December of 2001. 
B. The Analysis Sample and the Shift to Second-Generation Antipsychotics 
Following previous work (Frank et al, 2003), the current study uses diagnosis codes from the 
Medicaid claims data to determine whether an individual has been diagnosed with schizophrenia.8  
Selecting Medicaid recipients with one or more schizophrenia claims during the nine-year study period 
yields a sample of 37,369 individuals from the full 20 percent sample. Individuals ever residing in one of 
the seven counties that moved to a county organized health system in this period are dropped because the 
claims data would be incomplete for them.  The final sample consists of 32,072 individuals diagnosed 
with schizophrenia at least once between January of 1993 and December of 2001.  There is substantial 
variation across individuals in the number of schizophrenia claims, with 9.1% of the sample having just 
one schizophrenia claim while 7.1% of the sample has 500 or more claims during the study period.9 
 From 1993 to 2001, there were substantial changes in the pharmacological treatment of psychotic 
illness.  Table 1 lists the ten most commonly prescribed antipsychotics in the full 20% Medicaid sample 
in 1993 and in 2001,10 with the table providing both the number of prescriptions and the average amount 
spent per prescription.  As the table shows, the first-generation drugs haloperidol and thioridazine were 
the most commonly prescribed antipsychotics in 1993.  Eight years later the top selling drugs were 
                                                 
8 The data uses the ICD-9 coding system, and thus a diagnosis code that begins with 295 represents schizophrenia.  
Prescription drug claims do not have a diagnosis code though virtually all of the inpatient and outpatient claims do.   
9 The results presented below are not sensitive to dropping individuals with just one claim. 
10 In 1993 59% of these prescriptions are written for individuals in the schizophrenia sample while in 2001 that 
number is slightly higher at 62%.  The most common prescription provides a one-month supply. 
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Zyprexa and Risperdal, with Seroquel number three in terms of total spending and four with respect to 
total prescriptions.  These three drugs were not available in 1993 but accounted for more than 58% of all 
antipsychotic prescriptions and 86% of spending on antipsychotic drugs by 2001.  
C. The Causal Effect of Second-Generation Drugs 
Before proceeding to the empirical analyses, it is useful to define the structural parameters of 
interest for estimating the effect of second-generation antipsychotics.  Define for patient j a set of K 
potential outcomes for variable Y (e.g. Medicaid spending) in period t, with these outcomes representing 
the values of Y that would result in response to treatment with each of K possible drug treatments.  For 
simplicity set K equal to 3, with the three possible treatments being a second-generation antipsychotic, a 
first-generation drug, or no drug treatment.  This simplification captures the difference across these three 
categories rather than within each category.11 The effect of a second-generation drug relative to no drug 
treatment for individual j in period t is defined to equal ∆j0t = Yj2t - Y j0t and the corresponding effect 
relative to a first generation drug is ∆j1t = Yj2t – Yj1t.  Both parameters are indexed by j and t to capture the 
fact that the effect may vary across individuals or within a person over time.  Which of the two 
parameters is relevant for j will depend on whether he/she would otherwise take a first-generation drug or 
no drug at all.  The two parameters can be incorporated into the following equation for Yjt as follows: 
jttjtjjttjtjjt FirstSecondYY *)(*)1( 1000 ∆−∆+∆+=  
with Firstjt and Secondjt equal to indicator variables that are set to one if individual j takes a first or 
second-generation drug in period t, respectively, and zero otherwise. 
The challenge for reliable identification is that only one of the three potential outcomes is ever 
observed for individual j in period t.  If drug treatment were randomly assigned then one could obtain an 
unbiased estimate for the average effect of the drug simply by calculating differences in the sample 
means. But with observational data one must account for the fact that treatment is not random and thus 
                                                 
11 It would be straightforward to expand the measures of potential outcomes to allow for variation within a drug 
category and for outcomes to depend on both current and past treatment decisions.   
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may be correlated with both observable and unobservable determinants of the potential outcomes Yj0t, 
Yj1t, and Yj2t.  If not properly accounted for, this could bias any estimate of the effect of the new drugs.  
4. Time-Series Trends in Spending, Utilization, and Health Outcomes 
In this section, I investigate whether trends in average measures of Medicaid spending, 
utilization, and health appear to be affected by sharp changes in the use of Risperdal, Zyprexa, and 
Seroquel, three drugs approved by the FDA in the mid-1990s.12 Each column of Table 2 includes average 
annual measures of more than 30 variables for Medicaid recipients with one or more schizophrenia claims 
in each year.  One obvious concern with any examination of statewide trends is that the characteristics of 
individuals in the sample may change over time.  The first six rows provide average characteristics for 
Medicaid recipients diagnosed with schizophrenia in each year to explore this issue.  As is clear from the 
table, these averages remain fairly stable and to the extent that there are changes, they are gradual.  For 
example, the percentage of schizophrenia patients who are male increases by an almost equal amount 
from 1993 to 1997 (53.4% to 54.9%) as from 1997 to 2001 (54.9% to 56.5%).13  Additionally the number 
diagnosed with schizophrenia at least once during the year does not change much from one year to the 
next, ranging from a low of 12,114 in 1994 to a high of 14,083 in 2001.  It is therefore unlikely that there 
are any substantial changes in the characteristics of schizophrenia patients that coincide with the sharp 
changes in the use of Risperdal, Zyprexa, and Seroquel summarized in the next section. 
A. A Discontinuous Change in the Use of Second-Generation Antipsychotics 
Figure 1 and Appendix Table 1 provide information on the number of individuals taking any of 
the three major second-generation antipsychotics for the first time in each quarter.14 The first prescription 
for Risperdal in the sample was filled in late January of 1994.  In the first quarter of 1994, there are 584 
individuals in the sample who take Risperdal for the first time, with this number increasing to 878 in the 
second quarter. The number of new patients declines substantially in the next quarter, and is close to200 
                                                 
12 I do not consider the second-generation drug Clozaril because it is recommended only for treatment-resistant 
patients and because it was first used more than two years before the beginning of my study period.   
13 The trends summarized in this section are almost identical if I exclude the 15% of schizophrenia patients with one 
or more months in a managed care plan during the nine-year study period. 
14 A person can appear in this table only once – thus if he/she takes Risperdal in 1994, Zyprexa in 1996, and 
Seroquel in 1997, only the first Risperdal prescription would count in this table.   
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per quarter for the next two years.  Thus the number of individuals in the sample with one or more 
Risperdal prescriptions in each quarter increases only gradually during this period (Figure 2) after the 
initial increase in early 1994.  The first Zyprexa prescription appears in the Medicaid data in early 
October of 1996, shortly after the FDA approval in September of that same year.  As a result of this, there 
is a significant increase in the number of individuals taking either drug for the first time, which grows to 
457 by the third quarter of 1997.  And as Figure 2 demonstrates, there is a slight acceleration in trend in 
the number of individuals with a current prescription for a second-generation drug. 
A much sharper break in trend occurs in the fourth quarter of 1997.  As Figure 1 and Appendix 
Table 1 demonstrate, the number of Medicaid recipients in the sample taking a second-generation drug for 
the first time increases from 457 to 1513, with the number of new entrants remaining above 1000 for the 
next three quarters.  This increase was mainly caused by a state regulation that eased restrictions on 
prescribing second-generation antipsychotics.  This increase in the number newly taking a second-
generation antipsychotic translated into a sharp break in trend in the number of people taking one of the 
three drugs in each quarter, which more than doubled from 2849 to 5950 in just three quarters. 
B. Did Other Health Care Spending Decline? 
This sharp and substantial break in trend in the use of these three second-generation drugs 
provides an excellent opportunity to gauge their short-term effect on several outcome variables of interest.  
If second-generation drugs reduced the demand for hospital care and other health care services, one would 
expect to detect a decline in spending on schizophrenia-related services in the fourth quarter of 1997 or 
shortly thereafter. Figure 3 compares quarterly data for spending on antipsychotic drugs in the Medicaid 
sample with total (non-drug) spending for all care with a primary diagnosis of schizophrenia.   
As this figure shows, there is no apparent decline in spending on schizophrenia-related services, 
which continued on a gradual upward trend following the sharp increase in spending on antipsychotic 
drugs.  Because the number of individuals diagnosed with schizophrenia is not changing much during the 
study period, this trend looks almost identical if one instead summarizes costs on a per-patient rather than 
an aggregate basis. It is of course possible that other factors were changing in this same quarter, but the 
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fact that there is no detectable decline in spending on schizophrenia-related services undermines the 
hypothesis that the new treatments substantially lowered other spending. 
An alternative way to examine this issue is to compare the change in spending on antipsychotic 
drugs with the initial level of spending on schizophrenia-related inpatient and outpatient care.  From the 
first quarter of 1993 until the final quarter of 2001, spending on antipsychotic drugs for individuals in the 
sample increased by 610% - from $1.9 million to $13.4 million,15 with this growth almost entirely driven 
by the shift to the three new antipsychotic drugs.  The $11.5 million increase is just slightly smaller than 
the $12.7 million in total (non-drug) schizophrenia spending in the first quarter of 1993.  Thus to a first 
approximation the new drugs would have needed to lower inpatient and outpatient schizophrenia 
spending by more than 90% of the initial level to have reduced total health care spending. 
A wider set of outcome variables is summarized in Table 2.  Rows (7) through (12) provide 
annual averages for two categories of drug spending (antipsychotic and all other), three categories of non-
drug spending (schizophrenia, other mental health, and all other diagnoses), and total spending for 
individuals diagnosed with schizophrenia in each year.  Consistent with the quarterly data described 
above, there is no decline in average spending on inpatient or outpatient care in the latter half of the study 
period.  If anything, it appears that there is a trend increase in average inpatient and outpatient spending, 
which actually declined by 3.1% from 1993 to 1997 but then increased by 21.7% during the subsequent 
four years.  As a result of this increase and the accompanying growth in pharmaceutical expenditures, the 
growth rate of Medicaid spending for individuals diagnosed with schizophrenia increased from just 1.6% 
per year from 1993 to 1997 to a 9.3% annual rate during the 1997 to 2001 period.  This strongly suggests 
that the diffusion of second-generation antipsychotics, which accelerated beginning in the last quarter of 
1997, has substantially increased health care spending for individuals diagnosed with schizophrenia. 
Rows (13) through (18) summarize changes in the utilization of antipsychotic drugs in the sample 
of schizophrenia patients.  As row (17) demonstrates, nearly 70% were taking Risperdal, Zyprexa, or 
                                                 
15 This increase is larger than the one implied by Table 2 because it considers spending for those diagnosed with 
schizophrenia in any year while Table 2 only includes spending for individuals with a diagnosis in a particular year. 
 16
Seroquel in 2001.  This increase in the utilization of second-generation drugs coincided with a much 
smaller increase in the utilization of any antipsychotic treatment, with 77% of schizophrenia patients 
taking one or more antipsychotic prescriptions in 1993 and this number increasing to 87% by the end of 
the study period.  It therefore appears that most of the individuals taking Risperdal, Zyprexa, or Seroquel 
would otherwise be taking a first-generation antipsychotic rather than no drug treatment. 
Rows (19) through (24) list average measures of inpatient utilization among individuals in the 
schizophrenia sample.  The first two variables summarize hospital utilization while the next two describe 
the use of intermediate or long-term care facilities.  As the final two rows demonstrate, the use of 
inpatient care did not change substantially during the study period.  In 1993, approximately 37% of 
individuals diagnosed with schizophrenia spent one or more days in a hospital or long-term care facility 
and this fraction increased slightly to 38% by 2001.  Similarly, the average number of inpatient days 
remained virtually unchanged, declining from 26.7 to 26.5.  Similar trends emerge if one examines 
inpatient care for schizophrenia separately, with very little change during the nine-year study period. 
Rows (25) through (30) examine changes in the prevalence of two sets of side effects that 
previous studies suggest may be affected by the use of second-generation antipsychotics.  To estimate the 
prevalence of each condition, I simply calculate the fraction of individuals with one or more inpatient or 
outpatient claims with a primary diagnosis of each illness.16   This approach is admittedly imperfect, as 
some individuals may have a certain illness but it may not be coded on a claim.  The trends summarized 
in Table 2 suggest that the prevalence of diabetes and related illnesses have increased substantially during 
the study period.  As rows (28) through (30) show, the measured prevalence of tardive dyskenesia and 
other extrapyramidal symptoms declines substantially beginning from 1997 to 1998.  These trends are 
consistent with the findings from earlier studies – that second-generation drugs reduce the prevalence of 
EPS but may actually increase the prevalence of diabetes and related illnesses. 17 
                                                 
16 The diagnosis codes used for each of these side effects are as follows: diabetes (250, 362, 3572, 6480, 36641), 
hyperlipidemia (272), abnormal weight gain (783, 278), tardive dyskenesia (33382), parkinsonian symptoms (332), 
and other EPS (333 excluding 33382). 
17 It is worth noting that the prevalence of diabetes, hyperlipidemia, and abnormal weight gain did increase among 
other Medicaid recipients as well.  But a comparison of changes in the schizophrenia sample with other Medicaid 
 17
The final three rows summarize exit rates from the Medicaid program for individuals diagnosed 
with schizophrenia.  The first two rows summarize the fraction of individuals diagnosed with 
schizophrenia during the year who died during the current year or in the subsequent year.  There is no 
obvious change in this mortality rate from 1997 forward.  Interestingly, the rate at which individuals exit 
the program for other reasons does appear to decline substantially following the sharp increase in the use 
of second-generation drugs.  If these drugs increased the rate at which individuals returned to the 
workforce and increased their earnings, one would actually expect the opposite effect. 
The statewide trends summarized in this section shed some light on the effect of second-
generation antipsychotic drugs.  Most strikingly, the absence of a decline in spending on other types of 
medical care following the sharp increase in the fraction taking Risperdal, Zyprexa, or Seroquel 
undermines the hypothesis that the new drugs to some extent paid for themselves. 
5. Variation across Geographic Areas in the Diffusion of Second-Generation Antipsychotics 
One limitation of the analysis from the preceding section is that other factors may have been 
changing at the same time that the utilization of second-generation drugs exhibited a sharp increase.  If 
these other factors also influence outcome variables of interest then an examination of trends could 
provide a misleading picture of the effect of the new treatments.  In an effort to control for this potential 
source of bias, the current section exploits variation across areas in the rate at which Risperdal, Zyprexa, 
and Seroquel diffused.  As previous researchers have noted, there exist substantial differences across 
geographic areas in the use of health care treatments that cannot be explained by health differences alone 
(Skinner and Wennberg, 2000).  If similar variation exists for second-generation drugs, one can 
investigate whether areas in which the new treatments penetrated relatively quickly had significantly 
different changes in outcomes variables of interest by estimating specifications of the following type: 
zttzztztzt AnyRZSXY ελµγβα +++∆+∆+=∆)2(  
                                                                                                                                                             
recipients that controls for age, gender, race, and other factors demonstrates that the increase has been significantly 
greater for schizophrenia patients.  Because of space limitations these results are not reported here. 
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In this equation, z indexes geographic areas and t indexes time periods, while ∆Yzt, ∆Xzt, and ∆AnyRZSzt 
represent changes in the outcome variable, other explanatory variables, and the use of the three new 
drugs, respectively, from period t-1 to period t in area z.  The parameter γ captures the average change in 
Y that is associated with a one-unit change in the use of Risperdal, Zyprexa, and Seroquel. 
If the variation in the use of the new treatments is not systematically related with unobserved 
factors that influence the outcome variable of interest and if the effect of second-generation drugs does 
not vary across individuals, then the parameter γ would provide an unbiased estimate for the effect of this 
treatment on the outcome variable Y.  It is of course plausible that the variation across areas in the 
diffusion of the drugs is not strictly exogenous.  For example, certain areas may exhibit a larger increase 
in the use of second-generation drugs simply because a larger fraction of their schizophrenia patients 
experience a decline or an improvement in health.  If true and if these changes are not adequately 
captured in the ∆Xzt variables, then the parameter estimate for γ would be biased. 
Recognizing that there is no way to rule out this type of endogeneity, I aim to minimize its 
potential effect by focusing on market areas with a large number of patients.  This reduces the likelihood 
that random changes in individual-level health would lead to substantial variation in the utilization of 
drug treatments.  I consider the four-digit zip code rather than the county because these areas are much 
more similar in population within the state of California and more likely to approximate a health care 
market.  I include the 70 four-digit zipcodes with 50 or more Medicaid schizophrenia patients in 1993 and 
then follow these same patients for the subsequent eight years.18 The average distance from one Medicaid 
recipient to another within these four-digit zipcodes is 5.8 miles and the median distance is 4.1 miles.19  I 
focus only on those diagnosed in 1993 to obtain a baseline of spending and utilization for each individual 
and thus reduce the likelihood of composition bias.  Additionally, I pair each individual with their 1993 
zip code because future residential decisions could be influenced by changes in treatment or in health.  
                                                 
18A similar analysis at the county level would include just 24 counties with Los Angeles and San Diego together 
accounting for more than 50% of the observations.  The maximum share for any four-digit zipcode is just 5.9%. 
19 I calculate these distances using the exact longitude and latitude of the center of each zipcode. 
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And finally, I drop the 16% of Medicaid recipients in the sample with one or more months in a managed 
care plan during the nine-year study period because the utilization data will be incomplete for them. 
In the first year that Risperdal was available, there was substantial variation across geographic 
areas in the probability that Medicaid-eligible schizophrenia patients used this drug.  For example, 29% of 
the 149 patients in one four-digit zip code were using this drug, while less than 0.6% of the 180 patients 
in three low-utilization areas had one or more prescriptions filled for it.  Of the 70 selected market areas 
with more than 50 schizophrenia patients, 18 had less than 5% utilization of this new drug while 11 had 
more than 15%.  It is indeed implausible that this heterogeneity is entirely driven by differential health 
shocks.  Much of it may be driven by differences in the level of health across areas, but by taking first-
differences in the regressions I control for time-invariant differences across areas.  Additionally, I include 
zip code-specific effects in one-half of the first-difference specifications, which controls for differential 
trends in spending, utilization, or health across areas. 
In Table 3 I summarize the results from specifications analogous to (2) with variables defined at 
the four-digit zipcode-year level.  Each regression controls for changes in the fraction of patients who are 
dually eligible for Medicare, the average number of eligible months, and the fraction of the initial 1993 
sample that is still eligible for Medicaid.  These specifications also include year fixed effects and control 
for changes in the age, gender, and race of schizophrenia patients.20  The explanatory variable of interest 
is ∆ Any RZS, which is equal to the change in the fraction of individuals in the four-digit zipcode with one 
or more prescriptions for Risperdal, Zyprexa, or Seroquel. 
As the results in the first column demonstrate, increases in the use of second-generation drugs are 
significantly positively related with changes in expenditures.  In this column the dependent variable is the 
change in the log of average Medicaid spending.  The results suggest that a 10 percentage point increase 
in the use of antipsychotic drugs is associated with a 4.7% increase in average Medicaid spending. 21  The 
estimate is virtually identical when I include zipcode-specific fixed effects.  The next two columns 
                                                 
20 Each regression includes 12 age-gender interactions (with age groups 0-17, 18-29, 30-39, 40-49, 50-64, and 65 
plus) and four race variables (white, black, Hispanic, missing race). 
21 The analogous estimate from a county-level regression is quite similar at .500 with a standard error of .234. 
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summarize the relationship with average Medicaid spending, and suggest that this increases by $487 in 
response to a ten percentage point increase in the use of Risperdal, Zyprexa, or Seroquel.  This would 
translate into an effect of approximately $5000 per patient shifted to one of the three second-generation 
drugs, which is within the range of estimates from the randomized study cited above (Rosenheck, 2003). 
In the next two specifications I investigate the relationship between changes in the use of second-
generation drugs and the probability that an individual is hospitalized or admitted to a long-term care 
facility.  If the new drugs reduce the use of inpatient care, one would expect to find a negative coefficient 
on the parameter of interest.  Instead one finds the opposite – changes in the use of second-generation 
drugs are positively related with changes in the probability of staying one or more nights in a health care 
facility.  Specifically, a 10% increase in the use of second-generation drugs is associated with a 0.87% 
increase in the fraction of schizophrenia patients who are hospitalized and this first estimate is significant 
at the ten percent level. One concern with this estimate is that it may be driven by an omitted variable.  
For example, individuals may switch to a new drug after a hospitalization, which was itself caused by a 
change in their demand for medical care.  To gauge the importance of this possible source of bias, I 
determine the date that each individual first took Risperdal, Zyprexa, or Seroquel (if ever) and explore 
how individuals’ health care utilization changes in the days leading up to their first prescription by 
estimating specifications of the following type: 
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In this regression, ANYIPjt is an indicator variable that is equal to one if individual j stayed overnight in a 
hospital or other health care facility on day t and zero otherwise.  The variable FIRSTjt is equal to one if 
individual j’s first prescription for a second-generation drug occurs on day t and zero otherwise.  The PRE 
and POST variables are simply leads and lags for this day of the first treatment.  This regression also 
includes individual fixed effects to control for differences across patients in the use of inpatient care. 
In the specifications summarized in Table 4, the unit of observation is the person-day.  I use 
utilization data for the fifty days before and the fifty days after each individual’s first prescription for a 
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second-generation drug and thus have 101 observations for each individual.  There are 22,613 individuals 
in the schizophrenia sample who take Zyprexa, Risperdal, or Seroquel at least once on or before 
November 11, 2001 (with this end date selected so that I would have 50 or more post days) and thus there 
are 2,283,913 person-day observations in each regression. The results summarized in column (1) suggest 
that there is a significant increase in the use of inpatient care in the days leading up to an individual’s first 
prescription for one of these new drugs.  Specifically, an individual is 9.2 percentage points more likely to 
be in the hospital two to five days before the first prescription than they were 40 days earlier.  The 
magnitude of the coefficient estimates declines quickly from just before to just following the first 
prescriptions, suggesting that individuals often fill their first prescription upon leaving the hospital. 
The coefficient estimate of .092 from the person-day regression suggests that the two estimates of 
.087 from the zip code-year regressions are primarily driven by the increase in inpatient care preceding 
the first prescription for a second-generation drug.  But the fact that the estimates are almost identical also 
suggests that – for the remaining 90% of individuals who were not hospitalized just days before their first 
prescription – there was not a substantial decline in the likelihood of being hospitalized. 
In the next two columns of Table 3, I investigate whether the increase in the use of second-
generation drugs was associated with a change in the measured prevalence of extrapyramidal side effects.  
In this regression, the dependent variable is equal to the fraction of patients in the four-digit zipcode with 
one or more Medicaid claims that has a primary diagnosis of one or more extrapyramidal side effects.  In 
both cases the coefficient estimate for the ∆ Any RZS variable is negative, though neither is statistically 
significant. In the final two columns I summarize the results from analogous specifications for diabetes, 
hyperlipidemia, and abnormal weight gain. The estimates for the ∆ Any RZS coefficient suggest that areas 
in which the drugs were taken up relatively rapidly did have greater increases in the fraction of 
schizophrenia patients with one or more of these illnesses, and in both cases the estimates are significant 
at the ten percent level.  It therefore appears that, while the new antipsychotic drugs may have reduced the 
prevalence of certain adverse side effects, their effects on health were not uniformly positive. 
6. Individual-Level Estimates of the Effect of Second-Generation Antipsychotics 
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One limitation with the results from the previous section that use aggregate zip code-level data is 
that some of the differential use of these drugs across geographic areas appears to be driven by a change 
in individuals’ health and thus in their demand for medical care.  Specifically, almost 10% of individuals 
who initiate treatment for a second-generation drug are hospitalized just a few days before their 
prescription but were not in the hospital several weeks earlier.  Thus the coefficient estimates for the ∆ 
Any RZS variable will confound the actual causal effect of these drugs on the outcome variables of 
interest with the effect of this change in the demand for medical care. 
In this section, I attempt to surmount this obstacle to identification with individual-level analyses 
that exploit variation across psychiatrists in their propensity to prescribe second-generation drugs.  I use 
this variation to estimate the effect of second-generation drugs for the marginal patient and divide the 
sample into two distinct periods.  The first consists of the period up through and including the third 
quarter of 1997.  Until this time, the penetration of second-generation drugs was fairly gradual, as shown 
in Figures 1 and 2.  But beginning in the fourth quarter of 1997, the diffusion of second-generation drugs 
accelerated, with more individuals taking Risperdal, Zyprexa, or Seroquel for the first time in the 
subsequent nine months than in the preceding forty-five.  This increase was likely driven by legislation 
enacted in 1997 that made it easier for psychiatrists and other physicians to prescribe the new drugs. 
A. OLS Estimates of the Effect of Second-Generation Antipsychotics on Medicaid Spending 
I begin by estimating OLS specifications that examine the relationship between Medicaid 
spending for individual j in period t+τ as a function of her spending and utilization in period t and an 
indicator for whether she takes a second-generation antipsychotic in period t+τ: 
jtjtjtjttjtj NUTILIZATIORZSSPENDXSPEND ελγθβα ττ +++++= ++ ,,)4(  
In this equation, the variable RZSjt is defined to equal one if individual j has one or more Risperdal, 
Zyprexa, or Seroquel claims in period t and zero otherwise.  Following previous work (Manning et al, 
1987) I take the log of Medicaid spending because health care expenditures are quite skewed to the right 
and this produces a distribution that is much closer to the standard normal.  The parameter of interest in 
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this equation is γ, which represents the average effect of the new treatments on the log of Medicaid 
spending.  As emphasized above, the challenge for reliable estimation of this parameter is the endogeneity 
of treatment – individuals who take the drug may differ in unobservable ways from those who do not. 
The twelve specifications summarized in Table 5 examine the relationship between the use of the 
new drug treatments and the log of Medicaid spending in the four years from 1994 to 1997.  The sample 
includes the 9664 individuals from the 20% Medicaid sample who are at least 18 years old in 1993, have 
one or more schizophrenia claims (two or more if only outpatient) and twelve months of Medicaid 
eligibility in that year, and who have no months in a managed care plan from 1993 to 1997.  Because I 
take the log of Medicaid spending, individuals with no spending in a year will not be included in the 
regressions. 22  Additionally, those who die or become ineligible for Medicaid will also not be included. 
The first column summarizes results from a regression that controls for each individual’s age, 
gender, race,23 the number of Medicaid-eligible months in 1994, and the fraction of those months also 
covered by Medicare.  The statistically significant estimate of .926 on the Any RZS coefficient suggests 
that the use of Risperdal increased Medicaid spending in 1994, the first year that this drug was available.  
In transforming this into the implied dollar effect for each person, I account for heteroscedasticity and for 
deviations from the assumption of a normally distributed error term by using the smearing estimate 
developed by Duan (1983).  Using this retransformation method, I estimate the median effect of Risperdal 
on Medicaid spending in 1994 to be $5396 with the mean slightly lower at $5244. 
In the next column I summarize the results from a specification that controls for the log of 
Medicaid spending in 1993.  The addition of this one variable substantially increases the explanatory 
power of the regression, with the R-squared increasing from .094 to .524.  The coefficient estimate of 
interest declines to 0.596 with the median effect on Medicaid spending falling by 46% to $2921.  The 
magnitude of this change suggests that failing to control for baseline spending, which to some extent 
                                                 
22 Given that just 2-3% of the sample has zero spending in each subsequent year while eligible for Medicaid, 
excluding these observations should not be too problematic, though by dropping low-spenders from the “no 
treatment” group it will bias down the estimate for the effect of the new drugs on spending. 
23 The regressions include 12 age-gender interactions (with age groups 0-17, 18-29, 30-39, 40-49, 50-64, and 65 
plus) and four race variables (white, black, Hispanic, missing race). 
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captures the variation across individuals in illness severity, would bias the estimates. The inclusion of 15 
measures of health care utilization24 in 1993 in the third column reduces the point estimate further to .550, 
with the implied median effect falling to $2769.  Given the small standard errors on the estimate for Any 
RZS this parameter is quite precisely estimated, with the 95 percent confidence interval for the median 
effect ranging from $2626 to $2921.  
This first set of results suggests that the inclusion of detailed pre-treatment information on both 
Medicaid spending and health care utilization for each individual reduces the bias that is present in 
specifications analogous to the one summarized in column (1).  The next several columns replicate these 
first analyses for 1995, 1996, and the first three quarters of 1997.  In every case I use Medicaid spending 
and utilization data from 1993, a period when individuals could not have taken one of the three new 
second-generation drugs. Consistent with the results for 1994, the inclusion of 1993 Medicaid spending 
and utilization substantially lowers the point estimate for γ in each year.  The implied median effect in the 
specification with all of the control variables remains fairly stable over time, ranging from a low of $2435 
in 1995 to a high of $3230 in 1996. 25 
In Table 6 I estimate a similar set of specifications for the second half of the nine-year study 
period.  I focus on the period from the fourth quarter of 1997 forward, a time when the diffusion of 
second-generation drugs accelerated rapidly.  I include individuals diagnosed with schizophrenia at some 
point during the twelve months prior to this break in trend and exclude individuals with one or more 
prescriptions for a second-generation drug during that time period.  Using the fourth quarter of 1996 
through the third quarter of 1997 as my baseline year, I estimate a set of specifications analogous to those 
presented in Table 5 for the four years from 1998 through 2001.  Because it includes expenditure data for 
the last quarter of 1997, the spending data for 1998 include five quarters of information. 
                                                 
24 These measures include an indicator variable for whether or not an individual was hospitalized with a primary 
diagnosis of schizophrenia, the number of days that the person spent in the hospital with this diagnosis, and the 
number of days squared.  Analogous measures are constructed for four other types of claims – antipsychotic drug 
claims, other drug claims, outpatient claims, and days spent in long-term care with a schizophrenia diagnosis. 
25 Given that the 1997 specifications include just three quarters of spending, the estimate of $2953 for that nine-
month period suggests that the effects were largest in this year. 
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Consistent with the results from the previous table, the findings here suggest that the use of the 
new treatments was associated with a substantial increase in Medicaid spending, with the estimates for γ 
declining in every case when pre-treatment spending and utilization data are included.  The estimated 
effects are substantially larger during this period and increase over time.   For example, the estimate for 
the median effect of the new treatments on Medicaid spending in the third and final column for each year 
increases from a low of $5055 in 1998 to a high of $7011 by 2001.  This trend could be partially driven 
by changes in the characteristics of patients taking the drug, as the effect of the new treatments may vary 
across individuals.  Additionally, average spending on antipsychotic drugs for individuals taking 
Risperdal, Zyprexa, or Seroquel is increasing during this period.  Given that Any RZS is an indicator 
variable and thus does not capture increases in the intensity of treatment, one would expect an increase 
from one year to the next if the effect on other health care spending remained constant. 
Even with detailed information on spending and health in a pre-treatment year, however, it is 
possible that treatment decisions are correlated with unobservable factors that also influence the outcome 
variable of interest.  This motivates a search for a source of variation in treatment decisions that is 
unlikely to be driven by a change in an individual’s health. 
B. Variation across Psychiatrists in the Use of Second-Generation Antipsychotics 
 As previous researchers have noted, there is substantial variation across physicians in prescribing 
patterns even after controlling for differences in patient mix (Hellerstein, 1998).  In this section I aim to 
exploit this variation when estimating the effect of Risperdal, Zyprexa, and Seroquel on Medicaid 
spending.  I begin by pairing each Medicaid-eligible individual diagnosed with schizophrenia during the 
1993 calendar year with the psychiatrist they visited during that year.26  By constructing the sample in this 
way, I exclude schizophrenia patients who did not visit a psychiatrist in 1993 or who visited a psychiatrist 
                                                 
26 I choose the psychiatrist that individuals visited before they could have taken one of the three drugs to reduce a 
potential source of bias.  Specifically, it is plausible that a patient would, in response to a change in health, seek out 
a certain psychiatrist because of his willingness to prescribe a certain treatment.  I pair individuals who visited 
multiple psychiatrists with the one they consulted closest to the last day of 1993. 
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without an identifier in 1993. Of the 9664 individuals diagnosed with schizophrenia and used in the Table 
5 specifications, more than 47% have a paid claim to a psychiatrist with a provider ID.27    
Using utilization data from 1993 for the sample of schizophrenia patients who visited a 
psychiatrist at least once, I start by predicting the probability that each individual would take a second-
generation drug by estimating linear probability models of the following type: 
94,93,93,94,94,)5( jjjjj NUTILIZATIOSPENDXRZS ελθβα ++++=  
In this specification, the dependent variable is equal to one if the individual has one or more prescriptions 
for a second-generation antipsychotic in the year and zero otherwise.  This specification includes the same 
demographic, spending, and utilization controls defined above.  Using the results from this regression, I 
predict the probability that each individual took a second-generation drug in 1994.  For each patient-
psychiatrist pair, I then calculate the difference between the actual fraction of the psychiatrist’s other 
patients who take the drug and the fraction one would have predicted based on their baseline 
characteristics.  Specifically, I calculate the psychiatrist effect Zjk for patient j as follows:  
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with k indexing the psychiatrist for patient j and Nk equal to the total number of patients for psychiatrist k.  
In this equation, Si,k,94 is set equal to one if patient i of doctor k takes a second generation drug in 1994 
and zero otherwise.  The variable 94,,ˆ kiS  represents patient i’s predicted probability from regressions 
similar to (5) above. I exclude patient j’s realized and predicted treatment from this calculation to avoid a 
mechanical relationship between j’s treatment variable and the psychiatrist effect.  This index is 
constructed so that psychiatrists with relatively high values for this variable are intensive users of the new 
                                                 
27 These individuals do systematically differ from those patients without a visit, with average spending and 
utilization that is substantially higher.  For example, more than 28% of the Medicaid recipients who visited a 
psychiatrist were hospitalized in 1993 with a primary diagnosis of schizophrenia while just 10% of their 
counterparts were hospitalized with a schizophrenia diagnosis during the same period. A large fraction of the 
remaining 53% did visit a psychiatrist but their provider did not have an identifier in the claims data.  The reason for 
this is administrative – psychiatrists paid with Medicaid Short-Doyle funds are not identified - only the provider 
county is listed for these psychiatrists. 
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drug treatments while their counterparts with low values tend not to use the new drug.  It is important to 
emphasize that this psychiatrist effect controls for differences in patient characteristics, as much of the 
variation in the actual fraction taking the drug may simply be driven by differences across physicians in 
patient severity. 
 I next use this psychiatrist effect as an instrumental variable to predict treatment decisions for 
schizophrenia patients in 1994 and the subsequent three years.  The identifying assumption of this 
approach is that – conditional on each patient’s Medicaid spending, utilization, and other characteristics in 
1993 – psychiatrists only influence Medicaid spending in subsequent years through an effect on the use of 
second-generation drugs.  Though some psychiatrists may be more intensive users of other types of 
medical care and this may be correlated with their propensity to use second-generation drugs, the pre-
treatment controls for spending and utilization should at least to some extent control for this.  The main 
advantage of using predicted rather than actual treatment as an explanatory variable is that it is unlikely to 
be driven by a change in an individual’s own health. 
If psychiatrists did not differ in their prescribing patterns, then Zjk should not be significantly 
related with individual treatment decisions.  But as the results presented in the first-stage row of the first 
four columns of Table 7 demonstrate, this psychiatrist effect is significantly positively related with 
individual-level treatment decisions, with t-statistics ranging from 7.3 to 14.0.28 In these regressions I 
include only the 77 psychiatrists with 15 or more patients in 1993.29  Patients with psychiatrists who are 
intensive users of second-generation drugs – after controlling for the characteristics of the other patients - 
are significantly more likely to take Risperdal, Zyprexa, or Seroquel than their counterparts with low-
intensity psychiatrists.  Not surprisingly, the predictive power of this psychiatrist effect declines over 
time, with its coefficient falling from .822 in 1994 to .566 by 1997. 
                                                 
28 Standard errors are corrected to account for correlation in the error term within psychiatrist groups given that Zjk is 
essentially varying at the psychiatrist level rather than at the individual patient level. 
29 This is actually a strong restriction because I am using a 20% sample and this essentially requires a psychiatrist to 
have 75 Medicaid patients in 1993 to be included in the estimation.  More precision could no doubt be obtained with 
a 100% sample though the Department of Health Services unfortunately only makes a 20% sample available.  
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In the preceding rows of the same four columns of this table, I summarize the instrumental 
variable results from specifications that explain the log of Medicaid spending in each year as a function of 
predicted treatment and the 1993 spending and utilization measures.  In every case, the estimated effects 
are positive, and these estimates are statistically significant in 1995 and 1996.  The magnitude of the 
estimates and the implied median effects are similar to the ones from the corresponding OLS 
specifications though the standard errors using this method are substantially higher. 
I replicate these results in the next four columns for the second part of the study period.  Here I 
take the last quarter of 1996 and the first three quarters of 1997 as the base period and pair patients with 
one of the 61 psychiatrists that has more than 15 patients during that period.  Consistent with the OLS 
results, the estimated effects on Medicaid spending are larger during this high-diffusion period than the 
ones for the early period. Additionally the estimates increase over time, perhaps because the 
characteristics of the marginal patient or the intensity with which he/she is treated are changing over time. 
This seems plausible given that just 15% of the sample was taking a second-generation drug in 1996 
whereas nearly 70% were by 2001.  Once again the IV estimates are similar to, but typically larger than, 
the corresponding OLS estimates. 
Taken together, the OLS and IV specifications summarized in this section consistently 
demonstrate that the shift to second-generation antipsychotic drugs increased Medicaid spending.30  The 
magnitude of the estimates increases over time, suggesting that the effect for the marginal patient varies 
as the drugs diffuse to a larger fraction of schizophrenia patients.  Additional work is clearly needed to 
explore how the effect of second-generation antipsychotics on health care spending varies across 
individuals and across drugs at a particular point in time. 
7. Conclusion 
During the last decade, government spending through the Medicaid program and in the U.S. 
generally on prescription drugs has increased at more than a 15% annual rate.  Much of this increase was 
                                                 
30 In a companion set of results not summarized here because of space limitations, IV estimates of the effect of the 
drugs on the prevalence of adverse side effects were imprecisely estimated and typically insignificant. 
 29
driven by a shift to new drugs, which tend to be more expensive than earlier drugs within the same 
therapeutic category.  Previous research has suggested that new drugs may to some extent pay for 
themselves by reducing the need for other health care services.  The findings presented in this paper – 
which uses three different identification strategies and a data set with more than 30,000 Medicaid-eligible 
schizophrenia patients - undermine this hypothesis for the one category of prescription drugs that 
accounts for more government spending than any other.  Because of data limitations the results for health 
outcomes are necessarily more speculative but suggest that while the drugs may have reduced the 
prevalence of extrapyramidal symptoms they have also increased the fraction of schizophrenia patients 
with diabetes.  It is therefore not obvious that the net effect of the new treatments on health was 
sufficiently positive to justify the 610% increase in antipsychotic drug spending from 1993 to 2001. 
If second-generation antipsychotics are not substantially better than the first-generation drugs that 
preceded them, what explains their much greater cost?  Part of the explanation may stem from Medicaid’s 
reimbursement formula, which essentially sets the price of a drug close to the non-Medicaid price.   As 
the Medicaid market share increases, a profit-maximizing firm with patent protection would find it 
optimal to increase its price for non-Medicaid customers (Duggan-Scott-Morton, 2004).  This is simply 
because the Medicaid program has a zero co-pay and thus a Medicaid recipient or the physician acting on 
the patient’s behalf has little incentive to consider cost when choosing a treatment.  
Whether the results presented here generalize to other categories of prescription drugs or to 
individuals with other types of health insurance is of course not obvious. The incentives for Medicaid 
recipients are not much different from those that exist in many private insurance plans, which often have a 
small co-pay that may differ slightly between brand and generic drugs.  On the other hand, antipsychotics 
are very different from the typical drug category given that Medicaid accounts for the vast majority of 
spending on the drugs.  But with the recent passage of a Medicare prescription drug benefit, the share of 
pharmaceutical spending accounted for by government programs will increase substantially in the 
upcoming years.  Though drugs will be paid for differently under Medicare, Medicaid’s experience with 
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antipsychotics during the last decade may shed some light on what can occur when the government 
becomes the dominant purchaser for one category of prescription drugs.  
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Figure 1: # Taking Risperdal, Zyrexa, or Seroquel for First Time
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Figure 2: # Taking Risperdal, Zyprexa, or Seroquel
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Figure 3: Antipsychotic & (non-drug) Schizophrenia Spending
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1993
Drug Name # Scripts % of Total Total Paid % of Total Avg Price
Haloperidol 66018 20.5% $1,515 12.4% $23
Thioridazine 47832 14.9% $579 4.8% $12
Clozapine 41616 12.9% $4,374 35.9% $105
Lithium Carbonate 31381 9.8% $313 2.6% $10
Compazine 28585 8.9% $973 8.0% $34
Amitrip / Perp 28093 8.7% $327 2.7% $12
Fluphenazine 24131 7.5% $1,584 13.0% $66
Thiothixene 19188 6.0% $488 4.0% $25
Perphenazine 10749 3.3% $480 3.9% $45
Prolixin 4748 1.5% $558 4.6% $118
All Others 19322 6.0% $987 8.1% $51
Total 321663 100.0% $12,179 100.0% $38
2001
Drug Name # Scripts % of Total Total Paid % of Total Avg. Price
Zyprexa 113919 24.9% $41,120 47.6% $361
Risperdal 108969 23.8% $23,049 26.7% $212
Clozapine 50211 11.0% $6,494 7.5% $129
Seroquel 42785 9.3% $10,253 11.9% $240
Haloperidol 35480 7.7% $1,419 1.6% $40
Lithium Carbonate 21129 4.6% $408 0.5% $19
Thioridazine 13645 3.0% $251 0.3% $18
Fluphenazine 13136 2.9% $535 0.6% $41
Perphenazine 10875 2.4% $233 0.3% $21
Chlorpromazine 9306 2.0% $405 0.5% $44
All Others 38791 8.5% $2,170 2.5% $56
Total 458246 100.0% $86,337 100.0% $188
Table 1: Top Ten Antipsychotic Drugs in 1993 and 2001
Prescriptions Spending in $1000
Spending in $1000Prescriptions
Table summarizes Medicaid spending and number of prescriptions in the 20% 
California Medicaid sample for the top ten antipsychotic drugs in 1993 and 2001.
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
(1) Average Age 43.5 42.9 42.7 43.4 43.8 43.9 44.1 44.2 44.4
(2) Average Months Eligible 11.4 11.4 11.3 11.4 11.4 11.4 11.4 11.4 11.4
(3) % Medicare 44.0% 41.0% 39.4% 40.9% 41.2% 39.6% 39.6% 38.8% 38.3%
(4) % Managed Care 1.2% 1.0% 1.5% 2.1% 3.6% 5.3% 6.0% 6.2% 6.7%
(5) % Male 53.4% 54.6% 55.1% 55.1% 54.9% 55.7% 56.2% 56.6% 56.5%
(6) % Black 19.4% 19.3% 19.2% 19.8% 20.1% 19.8% 20.2% 20.3% 20.8%
(7) Avg. Antipsychotic RX Paid 586 791 893 937 1174 1867 2294 2562 2854
(8) Avg. Other RX Paid 671 686 654 775 925 1070 1259 1491 1760
(9) Avg. Schizophrenia IP/OP Paid 4049 4458 3973 3931 3834 4250 4504 4467 4898
(10) Avg. Other Mental Hlth IP/OP Paid 1811 1886 1573 1593 1560 1649 1680 1739 1970
(11) Avg. All Other IP/OP Paid 2187 2070 2122 2266 2401 2346 2590 2456 2621
(12) Avg. Medicaid Expenditures 9304 9892 9215 9502 9895 11182 12326 12714 14103
(13) % Any Risperdal 0.0% 13.0% 12.3% 14.1% 17.2% 22.8% 25.8% 30.4% 32.8%
(14) % Any Zyprexa 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 1.9% 15.8% 32.7% 36.6% 39.1% 39.9%
(15) % Any Seroquel 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.3% 4.9% 9.4% 13.0% 17.1%
(16) % Any RZS 0.0% 13.0% 12.3% 15.1% 29.3% 49.7% 58.1% 64.7% 69.0%
(17) % Other Antipsychotic 76.7% 81.7% 78.1% 76.5% 72.9% 66.6% 60.1% 54.6% 49.1%
(18) % Any Antipsychotic 76.7% 83.2% 81.1% 80.7% 81.6% 84.9% 86.2% 87.1% 86.7%
(19) Any Hospitalization 32.4% 34.0% 34.1% 33.9% 32.6% 33.5% 34.2% 34.7% 34.5%
(20) Average Hospital Days 6.7 7.5 7.4 7.2 7.3 7.4 7.5 7.7 7.9
(21) Any LTC/ICF 8.3% 7.5% 6.8% 7.1% 7.7% 7.8% 7.3% 7.7% 7.7%
(22) Average LTC/ICF Days 20.0 18.7 16.7 17.9 19.3 19.3 17.8 18.1 18.6
(23) Any Inpatient Care 36.8% 37.8% 37.5% 37.5% 36.3% 37.4% 37.6% 38.0% 37.9%
(24) Average Inpatient Days 26.7 26.3 24.1 25.1 26.5 26.6 25.4 25.8 26.5
(25) % Any Diabetes 7.29% 5.92% 6.62% 7.51% 8.30% 8.30% 8.99% 9.87% 10.86%
(26) % Any Hyperlipidemia 3.69% 2.91% 3.57% 5.17% 5.80% 5.10% 5.42% 6.61% 7.24%
(27) % Any Abnormal Weight / Obese 2.11% 1.55% 1.64% 1.09% 1.60% 1.49% 1.76% 1.85% 1.73%
(28) % Tardive Dyskenesia 0.65% 0.71% 0.80% 1.27% 1.07% 0.53% 0.44% 0.48% 0.43%
(29) % Any Parkinsonian Symptoms 0.81% 0.48% 0.47% 0.60% 0.71% 0.41% 0.61% 0.51% 0.63%
(30) % Other EPS 0.83% 0.74% 0.74% 1.07% 0.87% 0.69% 0.65% 0.65% 0.69%
(31) % Die this Year 1.40% 1.20% 1.46% 1.26% 1.28% 1.37% 1.23% 1.28% 1.33%
(32) % Die this or next year 3.14% 2.96% 3.18% 2.84% 3.10% 2.93% 2.98% 3.04% -
(33) % Leave - Other 2.72% 2.86% 3.07% 2.92% 3.04% 2.60% 2.78% 2.41% -
(34) Number Observations 12741 12114 12333 13578 14081 13329 13186 13481 14083
Table 2: Trends in Spending, Utilization, and Health Outcomes for Medicaid Recipients with Schizophrenia
Columns provide summary statistics for Medicaid recipients with one or more schizophrenia claims in each year.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
∆ % Any RZS 0.492*** 0.481*** 5383*** 4972*** 0.087* 0.087 -0.014 -0.014 0.069* 0.071*
(.117) (.125) (1096) (1154) (.050) (.055) (.016) (.017) (.038) (.041)
∆ % Medicare -0.927*** -0.944** -8284*** -7388** 0.002 0.033 -0.026 -0.019 0.032 0.016
(.343) (.378) (3213) (3504) (.148) (.165) (.046) (.051) (.111) (.125)
∆ Avg. Months 0.115*** 0.111*** 1064*** 1011*** 0.010 0.012 0.008*** 0.008** 0.031*** 0.032***
(.025) (.027) (232) (246) (.011) (.012) (.003) (.004) (.008) (.009)
∆ % Remaining 0.155 0.083 258 -206 0.027 0.028 -0.001 -0.005 0.066 0.086
(.283) (.313) (2649) (2901) (.122) (.137) (.038) (.042) (.091) (.103)
Year Effects? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Zip Trends? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-squared 0.295 0.339 0.362 0.413 0.121 0.148 0.130 0.168 0.182 0.202
Number Obs. 560 560 560 560 560 560 560 560 560 560
***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent level, respectively
Table 3: Area-Level Estimates of the Effect of Second-Generation Antipsychotics
∆ %EPS Claim ∆ % w/Diab,etc. Claim∆ Log(TotalPaid) ∆ TotalPaid ∆ % Hospitalized
Dependent variables in each specification represent changes in average annual measures of spending, utilization, or health at the four-
digit zip code level from 1993 to 2001.  Individuals diagnosed with schizophrenia in 1993 are included in the regression and paired with 
their 1993 zip code through 2001.  Specifications exclude individuals with any months in a Medicaid managed care plan and include 
only those four-digit zip codes with more than 50 people in 1993.  % Any R,Z,S equals one at the individual level if person has 1 or 
more Risperdal, Zyprexa, and/or Seroquel scripts in the year and zero otherwise.  Regressions are weighted by zip code's share of 
observations in each year.  Specifications include year effects, twelve age*gender interactions, and four race indicator variables.  
Specifications summarized in the even-numbered columns include zip code - specific time effects.
Any Inpatient Care? Any Outpatient Care?
PRE DAYS 41-50 omitted omitted
PRE DAYS 31-40 0.0077*** 0.0011
(.0009) (.0008)
PRE DAYS 21-30 0.0199*** 0.0083***
(.0013) (.0009)
PRE DAYS 11-20 0.0432*** 0.0148***
(.0016) (.0010)
PRE DAYS 06-10 0.072*** 0.0329***
(.0020) (.0013)
PRE DAYS 02-05 0.0915*** 0.0349***
(.0023) (.0014)
PRE DAY 01 0.0843*** 0.0514***
(.0023) (.0020)
FIRST SCRIPT 0.0599*** 0.0977***
(.0021) (.0024)
POST DAY 01 0.0152*** 0.0213***
(.0017) (.0018)
POST DAY2 02-05 0.0127*** 0.0028***
(.0017) (.0011)
POST DAYS 06-10 0.0149*** 0.0106***
(.0017) (.0011)
POST DAYS 11-20 0.0120*** 0.0071***
(.0016) (.0010)
POST DAYS 21-30 0.0101*** 0.0077***
(.0016) (.0010)
POST DAYS 31-40 0.0089*** 0.0024***
(.0016) (.0010)
POST DAYS 41-50 0.0073*** 0.0052***
(.0016) (.0010)
Number Observations 2283913 2283913
Person Effects? Yes Yes
R-squared 0.616 0.147
Table 4: Utilization Immediately Before & After First RZS Script
Specifications include 101 person-day observations for each of the 22613 
individuals in the sample with a Risperdal, Zyprexa, or Seroquel prescription 
by November 10, 2001.  For each individual, the day of the first prescription, 
50 days before this and 50 days after the first prescription are included.  
Dependent variable in each column is an indicator variable for whether 
person has inpatient or outpatient utilization on day t.  Each specification 
includes person fixed effects and standard errors are clustered at the person 
level to account for serial correlation in the error term.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Any RZSt 0.927 0.596 0.551 0.921 0.660 0.617 0.922 0.697 0.656 1.016 0.795 0.757
(.046) (.033) (.033) (.047) (.038) (.038) (.043) (.036) (.036) (.037) (.033) (.032)
Log (Total Paid93) 0.737 0.683 0.649 0.582 0.568 0.487 0.511 0.428
(.008) (.011) (.009) (.012) (.010) (.013) (.010) (.013)
Medicare Fractiont -0.475 -0.151 -0.203 -0.536 -0.288 -0.338 -0.399 -0.194 -0.251 -0.309 -0.128 -0.178
(.031) (.023) (.023) (.032) (.026) (.026) (.031) (.027) (.027) (.031) (.027) (.027)
Eligible Monthst 0.130 0.165 0.160 0.114 0.147 0.141 0.146 0.162 0.158 0.202 0.227 0.226
(.011) (.008) (.008) (.010) (.008) (.008) (.010) (.009) (.009) (.016) (.014) (.014)
R-squared 0.094 0.524 0.541 0.099 0.420 0.444 0.107 0.363 0.390 0.135 0.347 0.372
Utilization Controls? No No Yes No No Yes No No Yes No No Yes
# Observations 9492 9492 9492 9053 9053 9053 8642 8642 8642 8216 8216 8216
# No Longer Eligible 0 0 0 391 391 391 815 815 815 1195 1195 1195
# with Zero Spending 172 172 172 220 220 220 207 207 207 253 253 253
Median Effect 5396 2921 2769 4527 2674 2435 4571 3608 3230 4262 3270 2953
Table 5: OLS Estimates of the Effect of Second Generation Antipsychotics on Medicaid Spending: 1994-1997Q3
Log(Total Paid94) Log(Total Paid95) Log(Total Paid96) Log(Total Paid97Q1-Q3)
Sample includes the 9664 individuals eligible for Medicaid for 12 months in 1993, with one or more (two or more if only outpatient) schizophrenia claims in that year, 
who are eligible for at least one month in 1994, and who have zero months in a managed care plan from 1993 through the third quarter of 1997.  Dependent variable
in each column is equal to the log of Medicaid spending in a certain year, with the final measure including spending for just the first three quarters of 1997.  All 
regressions include include 12 age*gender interactions and 4 race indicator variables.  Specificatons in columns 3, 6, 9, and 12 include 15 controls for hospital, long-
term care, outpatient, and prescription drug  utilization (with any, # days or claims, and # days or claims squared).  The number of observations declines from one 
year to the next because individuals die, become ineligible for Medicaid, or have no spending in the year. 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Any RZSt 0.877 0.648 0.665 0.971 0.808 0.818 1.055 0.909 0.906 1.076 0.961 0.951
(.030) (.021) (.021) (.029) (.023) (.023) (.028) (.024) (.024) (.029) (.024) (.024)
Log (Total Paid96Q4-97Q3) 0.730 0.691 0.627 0.570 0.566 0.499 0.537 0.474
(.008) (.011) (.009) (.013) (.010) (.014) (.010) (.014)
Medicare Fractiont -0.379 -0.189 -0.230 -0.350 -0.200 -0.248 -0.312 -0.185 -0.234 -0.336 -0.214 -0.264
(.030) (.022) (.021) (.030) (.024) (.024) (.030) (.025) (.025) (.031) (.026) (.026)
Eligible Monthst 0.112 0.138 0.128 0.134 0.160 0.151 0.126 0.145 0.139 0.131 0.145 0.139
(.009) (.006) (.006) (.011) (.009) (.008) (.010) (.009) (.008) (.011) (.009) (.009)
R-squared 0.153 0.576 0.593 0.181 0.489 0.511 0.209 0.456 0.477 0.222 0.449 0.473
Utilization Controls? No No Yes No No Yes No No Yes No No Yes
# Observations 8002 8002 8002 7585 7585 7585 7292 7292 7292 6984 6984 6984
# No Longer Eligible 0 0 0 424 424 424 725 725 725 1032 1032 1032
# with Zero Spending 167 167 167 160 160 160 152 152 152 153 153 153
Median Effect 6417 4902 5055 5648 5417 5520 6510 5997 5957 7363 7122 7011
Log(Total Paid99) Log(Total Paid00) Log(Total Paid01)
Table 6: OLS Estimates of the Effect of 2nd Generation Antipsychotics on Medicaid Spending: 1998-2001
Log(Total Paid97Q4-98)
Sample includes individuals eligible for Medicaid for 12 months from 1996Q4 to 1997Q3, with one or more (two or more if only outpatient) schizophrenia claims in that 
year, with no claims for Risperdal, Zyprexa, or Seroquel during that 12-month period, and who are eligible for at least one month in 1997Q4 to 1998Q4.  Dependent 
variable in each column is equal to the log of Medicaid spending in a certain year, with the first measure including spending for the five quarters from 1997Q4 to 1998Q4.  
All regressions also include include 12 age*gender and 4 race dummy variables.  Specificatons in columns 3, 6, 9, and 12 include 15 controls for hospital, long-term care, 
outpatient, and prescription drug (antipsychotic and all other) utilization (with any, # days or claims, and # days or claims squared).  The number of observations declines 
from one year to the next because individuals die, become ineligible for Medicaid, or have no spending.
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
Any RZSt 0.351 0.854** 0.955* 0.667 1.116*** 1.148*** 2.235*** 1.881**
(.293) (.366) (.517) (.434) (.252) (.396) (.775) (.744)
Log (Total Paid93) 0.697*** 0.605*** 0.491*** 0.457***
(.023) (.022) (.026) (.027)
Log (Total Paid96Q4-97Q3) 0.655*** 0.556*** 0.453*** 0.506***
(.044) (.038) (.039) (.048)
Medicare Fractiont -0.187*** -0.318*** -0.23*** -0.105*** -0.261*** -0.251*** -0.268*** -0.264***
(.050) (.058) (.065) (.061) (.050) (.054) (.068) (.067)
Eligible Monthst 0.150*** 0.146*** 0.181*** 0.197*** 0.122*** 0.147*** 0.099*** 0.112***
(.025) (.026) (.022) (.046) (.029) (.028) (.030) (.047)
First-Stage Estimate 0.782*** 0.545*** 0.516*** .520*** 0.652*** 0.481*** 0.324*** 0.335***
(.056) (.057) (.063) (.071) (.078) (.084) (.087) (.086)
# Observations 2295 2190 2088 1999 1561 1488 1430 1378
# Psychiatrists 77 77 77 77 61 61 61 61
Utilization Controls? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Median Effect 2480 3481 3232 4379 5666 5895 6984 8008
Log(Total Paid)
Table 7: IV Estimates for the Effect of RZS on Medicaid Spending: 1994-2001
Sample for the 1994-97 regressions includes the individuals used in Table 5 with one or more visits to a psychiatrist in 1993 
while the 1998-2001 sample includes the indivudals used in Table 6 with one or more visits to a psychiatrist from 1996Q4 to 
1997Q3.   Additionally, the psychiatrist must have a provider ID and more than 15 patients from the sample in the base year.  
Dependent variable in each column is equal to the log of Medicaid spending in a certain year.  The base year for the 1994-97 
specifications is 1993 while for the 1998-2001 specifications it is 1996Q4-1997Q3.  First stage estimates for the physician 
effect are included.  All regressions also include include 12 age*gender interactions, 4 race dummy variables, and 15 
variables to control for inpatient and outpatient care and for prescription drug utilization in the base year.  Standard errors are 
clustered by psychiatrist.  The number of observations declines from one year to the next because individuals die, become 
ineligible for Medicaid, or have no spending.
Year Quarter First Current Antipsych Schizpaid
1993 1 0 0 1.88 12.72
1993 2 0 0 2.03 12.24
1993 3 0 0 2.08 13.69
1993 4 0 0 2.24 13.00
1994 1 584 584 2.26 14.10
1994 2 878 1342 2.97 13.33
1994 3 171 908 2.82 13.74
1994 4 205 1012 3.03 12.95
1995 1 206 1078 3.12 12.11
1995 2 228 1183 3.32 11.80
1995 3 195 1255 3.28 12.57
1995 4 201 1320 3.30 12.61
1996 1 227 1428 3.45 12.91
1996 2 253 1562 3.57 13.38
1996 3 204 1647 3.74 13.75
1996 4 335 1892 3.86 13.43
1997 1 400 2261 3.98 14.17
1997 2 404 2542 4.38 13.65
1997 3 457 2849 4.67 12.42
1997 4 1513 4459 5.89 13.82
1998 1 1154 5258 6.52 13.78
1998 2 1074 5950 7.39 13.98
1998 3 1045 6627 8.16 14.86
1998 4 902 7024 8.60 14.08
1999 1 905 7579 9.10 14.64
1999 2 840 8018 9.59 14.90
1999 3 839 8412 10.16 15.40
1999 4 643 8618 10.42 14.53
2000 1 776 9108 10.75 15.37
2000 2 637 9329 11.13 14.76
2000 3 685 9604 11.24 15.19
2000 4 621 9876 11.67 15.00
2001 1 625 10406 12.32 16.14
2001 2 574 10624 12.56 16.55
2001 3 476 10683 13.14 17.40
2001 4 467 10806 13.35 18.90
Appendix Table 1: Series for Figures 1, 2, and 3
